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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the resurgence of  Pauline Hanson and her One Nation Party to the Senate has 
dominated Australian political discourse. Specifically, her statements about Islam and 
Muslims have sparked discussion about the role of  political speech in our democracy. In this 
thesis, I seek to address the question at the heart of  this tension: should politicians’ fear-
mongering rhetoric be defended, or does it inflict serious trauma on our societies? I do so by 
focusing on the nature of  fear as a political emotion; its structure, its effects on individuals and 
democratic society, and its costs. Fear, I argue, is at the heart of  our problem with fear-
mongering rhetoric.  
In the first section of  this thesis, I contextualise this thesis as a contribution to the recent turn 
to ethics within liberalism, and as an extension on Martha Nussbaum’s extensive 
philosophical treatment of  political emotions in liberal democracy. In the second section, I set 
up the cognitive account of  political fear that I will use throughout this thesis. I demonstrate 
its role in perpetuating a range of  phenomena incompatible with a pluralist society, including 
significant epistemic harms. In the third section, I turn to the effects specific to fear-
mongering political rhetoric, and in the fourth, I weigh up the effects of  fear against our 
commitment to freedom of  speech. 
My unique contribution to this field is to point out that fear as an emotion is at the root of  why 
fear-mongering speech is objectionable in a liberal democracy. If  we do not acknowledge the 
emotional root and carrying force of  this kind of  speech, we fail to see what is at stake in 
debate over fear-mongering political rhetoric: it critically compromises citizens’ capacity to 
engage in political discourse. 
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I make the following disclaimer at the outset: for much of  this thesis, Senator Hanson serves 
as a token for politicians and political candidates who say discriminatory, fear-mongering 
things about Islam and Muslims. She is not alone, but she is the most visible. It is for this 
reason that I tend to use her as a signpost for the broader array of  fear-mongering political 
rhetoric to take place in Australian political discourse of  the last few years.  
ONE – ETHICS AND EMOTIONS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
1.1 – The Turn to Ethics 
In this first chapter, I contextualise this thesis within a broader trend in political philosophy 
and theory known as the ‘turn to ethics’. I justify Nussbaum’s focus on the presence and 
nature of  emotions in political life as a contribution to this field. Doing this will clarify the 
question at the heart of  this thesis: what is the problem posed by fear-mongering political 
rhetoric in a liberal democracy? 
The turn to ethics has many contributors, united by ‘the conviction that ethics constitutes that 
missing something that can help cure what ails democratic life.’  Ella Myers identifies this 1
trend as a response to two major crises facing modern democracy: sweeping political 
disappointment and disengagement on the one hand, and ‘reactionary and xenophobic 
movements that the institutions of  liberal democracy appear ill-equipped to address’ on the 
other.  The turn to ethics – as may be assumed by its unofficial title – aims to find a way of  2
bringing citizens of  liberal democracy back to an inclusive and self-motivated participatory 
 Ella Myers, Worldly Ethics; Democratic Politics and Care for the World, (London: Duke University Press, 2013), p. 1.1
 Myers, Worldly Ethics, p. 68.2
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politics by cultivating a motivating and stabilising democratic ethics. We are reminded that 
that a conceptual separation of  politics and ethics is artificial; ‘the phenomena that tend to 
travel under these names are already combined, for better or worse.’  Liberalism is not 3
morally “neutral”, but has a ‘definite moral content’ and ‘normative goals’ for society’s 
political culture.  4
A successful democratic ethos must accept and foster citizens’ genuine commitment to some 
fundamental normative commitments. Liberal democracy is built on values such as equal 
liberty, equality of  opportunity, citizens’ cooperation for the common good and legitimacy 
through sovereignty of  a democratic people. But protecting these values requires, and in turn 
fosters a ‘civic character’ and ‘ethical sensibility’ that will motivate and sustains citizens’ 
commitment to values that require daily self-sacrifice.  Though a definitive list of  these public 5
virtues has not been agreed upon, there is a shared conviction within the turn that such 
virtues do exist ‘and that their cultivation is a difficult but pressing question for liberals.’  This 6
project is particularly difficult because encouraging virtues and dispositions comes into 
conflict with liberalism’s core commitment to individual liberty and preventing government 
overreach. The project of  the ‘turn to ethics’ is thus doubly challenging. We must figure out 
how societies can encourage and institutionalise citizens’ commitment to a flourishing 
democratic ethos but do so in a way that ‘actually aids pluralisation’ and political participation, 
rather than inhibiting it.   7
 Ibid, p. 10. 3
 Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions; Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 4
p. 16.
 Mark Button, Contract, Culture and Citizenship: Transformative Liberalism from Hobbes to Rawls, (University Park: 5
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), p. 6.
 Myers, Worldly Ethics, p. 7.6
 Ibid, p. 8.7
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For Nussbaum, the focus of  cultivating a successful democratic ethos is ‘society’s political 
culture’ as opposed to aspects of  civil society to which ethics might otherwise be applied.  8
Nussbaum is drawing on Rawls’ idea of  ‘political liberalism’ but combines it with the kind of  
‘civic religion’ advocated by Rabindranath Tagore that aims at cultivating an open and 
compassionate political culture in which citizens can flourish. Nussbaum advocates a 
democratic ethos that applies the normative commitments of  liberalism to state institutions 
and matters of  political culture such as laws, institutions, ceremonies, public spaces and civic 
culture, education and public policy.  On this account, a healthy democracy is nurtured and 9
sustained by encouraging citizens’ inclusive and joint commitment to matters of  shared 
political concern. This is the democratic ethos I advocate and assume as background to the 
remainder of  this thesis. Later in this thesis, I argue that discriminatory, fear-mongering 
speech is corrosive to such an ethos. 
1.2 – Nussbaum’s Turn; Emotions and Liberalism 
In this section, I consider Nussbaum’s contribution to the turn to ethics: a thick discussion of  
the relation between emotions and a flourishing liberal politics. By doing this, I will be able to 
demonstrate that fear, and its cultivation by elected officials, it objectionable because of  the 
damage fear does to citizens’ ability to engage in that worldly ethics. By the end of  this 
section, we should have an idea of  the scope of  the problem at hand.  
 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, p. 16. 8
 Ibid, pp. 16-19.9
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The significance of  political emotions has been left largely unexplored in the tradition of  
liberal philosophy. Post-Rousseau, liberal philosophy’s silence on the role of  emotions arose in 
part from the liberal concern ‘that proscribing any particular type of  emotional cultivation 
might easily involve limits on free speech and other steps incompatible with liberal ideas of  
freedom and equality.’  Further, emotional moral theories suffer challenges of  particularism 10
and inconsistency. Moral sentimentalists such as Adam Smith and David Hume highlighted 
the importance of  emotional competence – in particular, our empathetic capacities – to the 
success of  pluralist societies.  Yet they also recognised that moral theories grounded in our 11
emotional capacities struggle with consistent and broad deployment.  Our emotional capacity 12
to treat each other well needs structural support if  it is to aid our political and social lives. 
The astute reader will note that this tension in the history of  liberalism broadly mirrors the 
problems faced by liberal democracies today: too disengaged on the one hand, and on the 
other so proscriptive we become polarised. But in the face of  this theoretical and real-world 
dilemma, liberal political philosophy has remained largely silent on the matter of  emotions.  
Nussbaum frames Political Emotions as a work to fill the space left by Rawls’ A Theory of  Justice. 
Rawls identified the need for a ‘reasonable moral psychology’ that might secure citizens’ 
endorsement of  political liberalism, but did not flesh out such an account himself.  In Political 13
Emotions, Nussbaum aims to show ‘how a decent society [can] do more for stability and 
"  Ibid, p. 4. 10
 Note that sentimentalists referred to ‘sympathy’ and the ‘sympathetic imagination’ to refer (roughly) to what 11
we mean by ‘empathy’ today.
"  Smith asks us to imagine that ‘the great empire of  China, with all its myriads of  inhabitants, was suddenly 12
swallowed up by an earthquake.’ Even a ‘man of  humanity in Europe’ would struggle to be moved by the event, 
Smith claims. ‘If  he was to lose his little finger tomorrow, he would not sleep tonight’ but ‘he will snore with the 
more profound security over the ruin of  a hundred millions of  his bretheren.’ Adam Smith, [1759], The Theory 
of  Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976), p. 136. 
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 25. 13
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motivation than Locke and Kant did, without becoming illiberal and dictatorial in the 
manner of  Rousseau.’  To begin with, liberalism must accept and advocate its own 14
normative commitments. ‘Liberalism has always stood for something’, Nussbaum asserts, ‘and 
has always asked people to endorse something: the equal worth of  persons, and their 
liberty.’  All political principles and efforts ‘need emotional support to ensure their stability 15
over time, and all decent societies need to guard against division and hierarchy’ by 
encouraging love for a common project outside ourselves: the nation and its welfare — for 
all.  16
How do we encourage citizens’ genuine commitment to liberal democratic values while 
accepting the fact of  pluralism? I reiterate Nussbaum’s claim that political philosophy and 
practice must pay due attention to the role played by political emotions in the stability and 
health of  liberal democracy. We are emotional creatures, and this aspect of  our psychology 
does not turn off  at the ballot box, so to speak.  Political emotions take the nation, its culture, 17
values and welfare as their eudaimonic object of  concern. Emotions are therefore crucial to a 
democratic ethos that seeks to cultivate and sustain citizens’ personal and joint investment in 
the nation and what is deemed to be good for it. That ethos can either be helped by 
benevolent political emotions, or hindered by baleful ones.  
Political emotions of  the right sort — compassion, love, joy — help motivate and secure 
citizens’ participation in ‘worthy projects that require effort and sacrifice’ such as the 
 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, p. 5. 14
 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity; Disgust, Shame and the Law, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 15
61.
 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, pp. 2-3. 16
 Ibid, p.9.17
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environment, the inclusion of  marginalised groups, foreign aid and social distribution. 
Healthy, open-minded emotional investment in the nation and its goals can facilitate citizens’ 
genuine and stable interest in a collaborative, flourishing ethos of  liberal democratic politics. 
Such an ethos is cultivated by designing ‘institutions that represent the insights of  a valuable 
type of  emotion’, such as compassion and love, and educating citizens in those dispositions.  18
Citizens should be encouraged to form an emotional commitment to the values and virtues of  
liberalism as well as to a compassionate and open reading of  the nation’s unique laws and 
institutions, geography, historical personalities, events and common goals. Decent political 
emotions can inspire citizens’ political engagement and sustain their commitment to a 
democratic ethos over time. 
On the other hand, political emotions are bad for liberal democracy when they undermine 
the values of  liberty and equality and citizens’ commitment to political cooperation.  All 
societies ‘have to grapple with the history or current reality of  group subordination’ and so 
must move to quell the emotions at the root of  these problems: disgust, shame, and fear. 
These emotions are considered corrosive because of  their exclusionary, narrowing natures 
and their propensity for sowing division and inequality.  In this thesis, I focus on the role of  19
fear in Australia as a contemporary liberal democracy.  
Fear narrows our circle of  concern. When we fear for our nation based upon discriminatory 
beliefs about another group of  people, our concern is no longer equal, nor is it extended 
toward the good of  the nation. In the throes of  self-protective fear, we can forget others’ 
freedoms and our emotional commitment to the wellbeing of  the nation and its political 
 Ibid, p. 20. 18
 Ibid, p. 322.19
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culture.  For this reason, a liberal democracy looking to encourage an ethos of  commitment 20
to worldly things needs to think about ‘limiting and properly directing fear, for once it gets 
going, the good of  others is all too likely to fade into the background.’   21
In this section, I have contextualised Nussbaum’s work on political emotions within the turn 
to ethics. Harnessing political emotions can secure citizens’ stable but genuine attachment to 
the kind of  democratic ethos that focuses on the nation’s wellbeing and political culture for 
the good of  all. Some emotions — the narrowing, exclusionary, short-sighted ones like fear — 
are intolerable in liberal democracy: they are hindrances to that project of  collaborative care 
for our nation and ethos. As Nussbaum points out: ‘Ceding the terrain of  emotion-shaping to 
anti-liberal forces gives them a huge advantage in the people’s hearts.’  In Section 4, I argue 22
that ceding of  the emotional terrain to anti-liberal forces is what happens when a type of  
rhetoric — discriminatory, fear-mongering political speech — is accepted as legitimate 
political discourse in a liberal democracy.  23
TWO – POLITICAL FEAR, ISLAMOPHOBIA, DISCRIMINATION 
In this chapter I establish and motivate a cognitive account of  emotions and translate this into 
an account of  political fear. This will begin the task of  clarifying why fear it is problematic in 
a liberal democracy. When I refer to ‘fear’ throughout this thesis, I mean a political fear 
predicated on prejudicial beliefs about a group of  people, such as that of  my test case: 
political fear of  Islam and Muslims in Australia. In this chapter, I will analyse the belief  and 
 Ibid, p. 122. 20
 Ibid p. 322.21
 Ibid p. 2. 22
 Nussbaum analyses rhetoric in Political Emotions, but uses instances, rather than a style of  speech. See her 23
analysis of  speeches delivered by Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 
pp. 322- 328. 
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behavioural profiles of  political fear of  Islam and why political fear is unsustainable in a 
liberal democracy. This will take us to a point where we can consider why, then, fear-
mongering speech is objectionable.  
2.1 — A Cognitive Account of  Fear  
My purpose in this thesis is to explore the interaction between political fear and political 
rhetoric in a liberal democracy, and to articulate the problem posed by fear mongering 
rhetoric. Many share the intuition that such a phenomenon is degrading or damaging in a 
way that extends beyond experiential harm; I want to articulate that further and offer a 
philosophical account of  the damage.  Before we can explore the relationship between fear 24
and language, however, I want to deepen our account of  fear as an emotion. I use 
Nussbaum’s Aristotelian model of  cognitive emotions as a foundation for this work.  25
Nussbaum’s model demonstrates the roles, both corrosive and nurturing, that emotions play 
in political society.   Further, her account contains a a cognitive element that illuminates the 26
power of  political rhetoric. Politicians cannot directly affect citizens’ mood states or bodily 
feelings. But they can, in various ways, shape what citizens believe about certain things, and 
those beliefs appear to be a part of  what emotions themselves are.  
On Nussbaum’s model, emotions take the following form: a belief  or set of  beliefs about an 
intentional object, X, induces and/or shapes an emotional response of  a particular feeling 
 Mike Seccombe, ‘How Pauline Hanson Changes Politics Through Fear’, The Saturday Paper, 23 July, 2016; Shen 24
Narayanasamy, Pauline Hanson's ruthless fearmongering creates new wounds and opens old scars’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 15 September 2016; for an extensive account of  the damage done by hateful and discriminatory 
speech, see: Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado and Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw, 
Words that Wound; Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004).
"  Nussbaum, Political Emotions, p. 322. 25
"  Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity, pp. 26-27. 26
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and psychological character toward X, where those beliefs are constitutive of  that emotion’s 
unique profile. Fear, then, is an emotional response characterised by a belief  that something 
destructive is about to happen, at the hands of  a particular threat, against which defence will 
be difficult or unlikely. Like Nussbaum, I take the beliefs that underpin these reactive 
emotional responses to be ‘quite elastically and simply’ a matter of  “seeing X as Y”.  27
Indignation, for example, involves seeing a negative or harmful act as unjustly done against us 
or something we value.  Emotion-relevant beliefs, for the purposes of  this thesis are 28
‘appraisals or evaluations of  the object’ that can stand alone or as part of  a broader 
attitudinal structure. Further, they are operative in the sense that our behaviour can be 
motivated by a belief  without our being explicitly cognisant of  the belief  or its impetus.  29
Importantly, emotions involve appraisals that value ‘the object as significant rather than 
trivial’ to oneself  or one’s goals.  Emotions are in this way ‘eudaimonic’ insofar as they are 30
focused on an object that is deemed in some way relevant to a valuable life.  If  we take these 31
cognitive elements away from our account of  emotions, we are left with little more than 
‘unintelligent bodily forces’ and instinctive reactions.  Beliefs and emotions are connected ‘in 32
a very intimate way.’   33
Imagine, for instance, that I believe that whales are dangerous, human-eating creatures. 
When faced with a whale, and little means of  escape, my emotion towards it will be one of  
 Ibid, p. 27.27
 Ibid, p. 102. 28
 Ibid, p. 28. 29
 Ibid, p. 29. 30
 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, p. 11, pp. 144-45. 31
 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity, p. 23. 32
 Ibid, p. 27.33
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fear. On the other hand, imagine that I believe that whales as a species have intentionally 
harmed me in a way that I do not deserve: my overriding emotional response toward whales 
will be indignation or, anger.  Fear’s unique belief  profile is therefore the following:  34
a belief  about an object, X, which involves perceiving X as a likely and 
significant threat to oneself  or one’s circle of  concern.   35
In sum; fear has a cognitive, eudaimonic structure that consists in an emotional reaction to a 
belief. When I speak of  fear's 'belief  profile', this is the cognitive structure I speak of. 
One advantage of  conceiving of  fear in terms of  a ‘belief  profile' is that we can then explain 
why we often think that it can be judged by standards of  reasonableness. Such judgments are 
generally aimed at the reasonableness of  the beliefs behind the fears. One way we judge 
reasonableness of  belief  is in accordance with how significant the threat is. ‘Significant’ here 
denotes two things: 1) the threat is significant in scale, where scale means the scale of  
potential damage, and that the damage will be to something significant to me and 2) 
significant in likelihood. If  my fear of  whales were grounded in an absurd belief  that the 
planet’s Cetaceans are plotting to take over the planet as sea levels rise, you could have cause 
to doubt the reasonableness of  my whale-fear.  This matters for our purposes because the 36
unreasonableness of  beliefs is where the ‘many potential problems’ of  political fear 
 Sets of  beliefs can hold for closely related emotions. Nussbaum has noted that, unlike indignation, anger 34
involved the desire for retribution. Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016, Kindle Version), Chapter 2, Section 2, Loc. 842.
 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, pp. 320-322.35
 Reasonableness of  belief  and reasonableness of  emotional response do not necessarily track each other, 36
though. I may have a reasonable belief  about whales (they can be aggressive) but an unreasonable fear (a 
phobia).
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originate.  In all societies, ‘rhetoric and politics work on ideas of  what is dangerous’, often 37
‘constructing the perception of  danger’ where it does not exist.  We can misidentify a threat, 38
or misjudge its size, misattribute blame for the threat or ‘have a conception of  our well-being 
that is off-kilter’, making us fear things that are not bad for us at all – ‘for example, the 
inclusion of  new ethnic groups in our nation.’  It is this kind of  fear, unreasonable fear, that I 39
will address in this thesis. My goal is to demonstrate why unreasonable fear grounded in 
prejudicial beliefs is deeply corrosive to liberal democracy.  
So far I have said that fear has a cognitive element, or a ‘belief  profile', and that this makes it 
an apt candidate for social judgements of  reasonableness. This note about reasonableness 
raises another aspect of  our emotions crucial to my argument: their behavioural profiles. As 
Nussbaum points out, ‘fear is an unusually primitive emotion’, closely related to humans’ 
intuitive fright response.  As we will see, the behavioural tendencies of  fear — particularly 40
avoidance and aggression – are damaging to democracy, so exploring its relation to primitive 
fright here is important. Sometimes we react to fear with avoidance behaviours. For example, 
I might paddle away as quickly as possible when I see a whale. Fear can lead us to non-
avoidant types of  behaviour, too. If  my fear is laced with paranoia, I might find out 
everything I can about whales. Alternatively, I might lash out in violent self-defence. Fear’s 
behavioural profile ‘involves deeply implanted evolutionary tendencies’ aimed at protecting 
that which is threatened.  An important aspect of  these behaviours is that they, too, can be 41
 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, p. 322.37
 Ibid.38
 Ibid.39
 Ibid, p. 320. Nussbaum points to research by Joseph LeDoux that shows that this relationship exists but 40
remains physiologically unclear.
 Ibid, p. 321.41
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judged more or less reasonable depending on the proportionality of  a behavioural response to 
a threat. 
I have presented an account of  fear as grounded in more or less reasonable beliefs about 
threat and harm, and which has the tendency to produce a range of  behaviours aimed at self-
protection. Building from this account of  fear, we can begin to see what political fear looks like. 
Fearing for one’s nation involves determining that the nation is important to one’s self  and 
goals qua citizen; it becomes, as Nussbaum would put it, a part of  our ‘circle of  concern’.  It 42
also involves the perception of  an intentional object as a likely and significant threat to the 
nation. I adopt Nussbaum’s definition of  political emotions as emotions that take ‘the nation, 
the nation’s goals, its institutions and leaders, its geography, and one’s fellow citizens seen as 
fellow inhabitants of  a common public space’ as their subject of  eudaimonic concern.   43
So far my discussion of  fear has been largely in the abstract. In order to demonstrate the 
interest in investigating political emotions, let me give a real example that shows how fear can 
be a political emotion. This example prompts my thesis that  the problem with fear-
mongering political speech, in philosophical terms, is that it intolerably damages citizens' 
discursive capacities and communities.  
2.2 — Political fear and ‘Islamophobia’ 
The central case of  this thesis is political fear of  Islam and Muslims in Australia. The fear I 
have in mind is based on the belief  that Islam is a danger to ‘the nation’. Such fear reveals 
 Ibid, p. 11, pp. 244-245, pp. 262-266. 42
 Ibid, p. 2. 43
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certain things the agent believes, things that position Australia as something valued, and Islam 
as something threatening it. In this section I will compare how the political fear of  Islam and 
Muslims in Australia corresponds to the conceptual account of  fear already outlined. For 
clarity, I present ‘every day’ fear and political fear of  Islam in the following schema: 
Fear is the perception of  an intentional object, X, as a likely and 
significant threat to oneself  or one’s circle of  concern, based on and 
defined by certain beliefs about X. 
Fear of  Islam and its adherents as a political emotion is the perception 
of  Islam (or of  individuals perceived to be Muslims), as a likely and 
significant threat to one’s nation or oneself  qua citizen, based on and 
defined by certain beliefs about Islam.   44
This fear is often labelled ‘Islamophobia’, variously defined as the ‘intense dislike or fear of  
Islam, esp. as a political force; hostility or prejudice towards Muslims’ and ‘hostile feelings, 
discrimination, exclusion, fear, suspicion or anxiety directed towards Islam or Muslims.’  45
Importantly, this schema shows us that fear of  Islam involves believing certain things about 
one’s nation just as much as believing certain things about the other. This is central to my 
argument about the nature of  political fear as perception of  a threat to one’s nation — often, 
Islamophobia is unreasonable because it involves a misapprehension of  the thing being 
threatened. But first, let us canvass Islamophobia’s other-oriented beliefs.  
 This thesis only addresses fear of  Islam as a political fear. A personal phobia of  Islam for reasons not related 44
to the nation or one’s actions as a citizen is not considered here.
 Islamophobia n.’, Oxford English Dictionary, 2016. Available: oed.com; Riaz Hassan, Bill Martin, ‘Islamophobia, 45
Social Distance and Fear of  Terrorism in Australia; a Preliminary Report’ (2015), p.7. 
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First, ‘Islamophobia’ is a fear of  Islam and Muslims. This is arguably because Muslims are the 
physical instantiation of  the threat. It might also simply be a fear of  anyone who can 
subscribe to a ‘threatening’ belief  system. Second, the reference to fear of  Islam ‘as a political 
force’ identifies the fact that Islam is often perceived to be a political threat. Islamophobia is by 
definition a political fear. Third, I would contend that insofar as Islamophobia is grounded in 
unreasonable, prejudicial beliefs, it is an unreasonable fear. Of  course, this may not satisfy some, 
particularly those who subscribe to Islamophobic beliefs. They will disagree with me that their 
beliefs are unreasonable, and perhaps try to explain to me why. That may be the case, but I 
have had to bracket such debate and take it as given that the kinds of  fears I talk about in this 
thesis are unreasonable — they are not grounded in accurate or fact-based appraisals of  
threat, or the thing being threatened. Throughout the rest of  this thesis, when I use the term 
‘Islamophobia’, I use it as shorthand for ‘political fear of  Islam’ in the sense I have now 
defined it: the perception of  a threat to one’s nation or oneself  qua citizen where the object of  
that fear is Islam or Muslims as intentional objects. 
Islamophobia is not a coordinated school of  thought, and ‘what do Australians believe about 
Islam?’ is mostly an empirical question.  For this thesis, I have chosen beliefs expressed by the 46
kind of  speaker I am interested in in this thesis: an elected or campaigning politician. I do this 
for two reasons. One is that the positional and epistemic authority that these speakers possess 
elevates the impact of  their speech, and therefore its motivating emotion on societies. Another 
reason I choose to canvass fear-mongering by politicians is that it has arguably been the 
zeitgeist of  western liberal democracies in 2016.   47
 Limited empirical data on beliefs about Australian identity and Islam exists. I refer to it where relevant. 46
 I began writing on this topic in July 2015, so its particulars have changed with ongoing developments.47
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In Australia, Senator Pauline Hanson has dominated political discourse around this issue. On 
a policy page dedicated to Islam, One Nation’s website declares that ‘Islam does not believe in 
democracy, freedom of  speech, freedom of  the press or freedom or assembly’, and that ‘its 
religious aspect is fraud; it is rather a totalitarian political system…masquerading as a 
religion.’  At the time of  writing, her comments on Islam culminated with her call for a halt 48
on Muslim immigration to Australia until a Royal Commission into whether Islam is a 
religion has been conducted.  49
In neither number nor position on the political spectrum are these beliefs “fringe" or 
“outliers” in Australian political life. One Nation received more votes for the senate at the 
2016 federal election than there are Muslims in Australia.  49% of  people polled agreed with 50
Senator Hanson’s call for restricted Muslim migration and 48% believed that, given terrorist 
attacks overseas, there should be a national debate on Muslim migration.  One much-51
circulated article in 2016 expressed the fear that Muslim migration would be connected with 
increased homophobia and misogyny.  Demonstrating that Islamophobia is a broad church, 52
Senators Jacqui Lambie and the publicly homophobic Cory Bernardi share Islamophobic 
 One Nation, ‘Policy; Islam’ (2016). 48
 This claim was most directly made in her maiden speech to the Senate, but reiterated to press. 49
Commonwealth of  Australia, Senate. "First Speech." 78: 14 September, 2016; Rachel Eddie, 'We speak for the 
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 Essential Media Communications [EMC], ‘Ban on Muslim Immigration’ (21 September 2016); EMC, 51
‘Statements About Pauline Hanson’ (21 September 2016). The polling is dated now, but in 2011 57% of  people 
polled said they had ‘concerns’ about the number of  Muslims in Australia. EMC, ‘Concern About Muslims 
(Pre-information)’ (28 February 2011). 
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beliefs, including this concern about Islam’s treatment of  women.  Both describe Muslim 53
womens’ religious headscarves as a ‘shroud of  oppression’, ‘not right’ in Australia, a device 
Muslim men use to control Muslim women and a ‘security issue’.   54
Further, fear of  Islam is not exclusive to anti-Establishment politicians. It has been voiced by 
members of  elected government. At a Reclaim Australia rally in 2015, Liberal member for 
Dawson, George Christensen, declared his belief  that Australian values and ‘the Australian 
culture and the Australian lifestyle that we love’ are under threat from ‘those who hate us for 
who we are and what we stand for’.  Finally, former Prime Minister, Tony Abbott has made 55
statements that engage with this fear. In response to terrorist attacks in France, Abbott stated 
that there is a ‘massive problem within Islam’ and that ‘I feel it’s very hard to reconcile what’s 
in the Koran with a modern, secular, pluralist democracy [sic].’  56
I want to draw attention to two features of  these examples, and what they tell us about the 
nature of  political fear of  Islam in Australia. I make these themes transparent so that we have 
a firm grasp of  the problem before analysing why these beliefs and their propagation through 
political rhetoric are corrosive in a functioning liberal democracy. 
 Pun intended.53
 Latika Bourke, ‘'Stupid and ignorant': Cory Bernardi's comments linking terrorism raids with a push to ban 54
burqa slammed’, Sydney Morning Herald (18 September 2014); Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘PUP senator 
Jacqui Lambie says she would not let burka wearers into her office; backs calls for ban’, Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, (20 September 2014); Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Senator Jacqui Lambie struggled to 
explain Sharia Law’, YouTube,  (20 September 2014).
 Christensen, ‘Reclaim Australia Address’. 55
 Dan Conifer, Tony Abbott calls for 'religious revolution' inside Islam, defends controversial 2014 budget 56
measures as 'justifiable and right'’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, (9 December 2015); Lisa Cox, ‘“You don't 
migrate to this country unless you want to join our team”: Tony Abbott renews push on national security laws’, 
Sydney Morning Herald (18 August 2014).
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First, these examples demonstrate two themes within Islamophobic beliefs in Australia: that 
Islam poses a safety threat, and that it is incompatible with Australia’s political culture. The 
former fear is based on peoples’ belief  that the presence of  Islam and Muslims in a country 
has a close or even necessary connection with terrorist attacks. The latter school of  belief  
perceives Islam as a political threat to values like equality and secularism. This seems to be 
connected to the idea that Islam has a value system so foreign that Muslims ‘do not integrate 
into Australian society’.  Islam is perceived as dangerous, archaic and ‘unAustralian’ to the 57
point of  being an existential threat. 
Second, these examples reveal something about what fearful citizens believe about Australia. 
Earlier I said that my schema of  Islamophobia as political fear revealed that the relevant 
belief  is often oriented towards the nation itself, just as much as the 'invasive other'. The cases 
above illuminate this: the speakers' Islamophobia appears motivated the belief  that there is an 
Australian way of  life, set of  values and identity to which Islam poses a threat.  Objections to 58
the hijab, for example, are often made on the grounds that Australia is defined by its 
commitment to modern democratic values of  freedom and equality. To believe that the hijab 
is a threat to Australian values suggests that one believes that Australia is strongly dedicated to 
equality for women and strict non-violence towards them. Finally, the idea that ‘they don’t 
integrate into our society’ suggests that Muslims are not already a part of  our national identity. 
These themes point to something more generalised about what people believe Australia as a 
“nation” to be. In A New Religious Intolerance, Nussbaum comments that Australia is among a 
series of  liberal democracies characterised by political, rather than ethnic or cultural self-
 EMC, ‘Reasons for Supporting Ban’.57
"  Lisa Cox, ‘Tony Abbott: Societies can't 'remain in denial about the massive problem within Islam’, Sydney 58
Morning Herald, (9 December 2015). 
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identities. Australia’s identity, Nussbaum claims, is positively and openly shaped around our 
history of  immigration and ‘shared goals and ideals, thus in a way that does not require 
homogeneity.’  On this, Nussbaum is mistaken. For much of  its existence since British 59
colonisation, Australia’s politicians very specifically cultivated national identity in racial and 
religious terms. Various iterations of  the White Australia policy sought to ensure that 
Australia was a white, largely Christian nation by erasing Australia’s indigenous population, 
while also ensuring that those who entered the country were white, able-bodied and 
Christian.  Various non-white minorities have in turn been the object of  this cultural and 60
political anxiety.    61
Islam is widely perceived as a threat to Australian culture and way of  life.  For some, this is 62
because Australia is a nation ‘founded on Judaeo-Christian values’ with which Islam is 
incompatible.  But all who oppose more open immigration policies do so because they 63
conceive of  ‘the nation’ in ethnic or racial terms. But these attitudes are conceived in cultural 
terms, where ‘culture’ seems to be varyingly defined in political, social and religious terms. 
This point about Australia’s history of  self-identification along cultural and ethnic lines will 
later become crucial to my argument that, as a nation not conceived along political lines, 
Australia has a weak point for discriminatory, fear-mongering rhetoric to do harm.  
 Nussbaum acknowledges that ethnic and cultural self-identification is characteristic of  European nations, but 59
fails to note the legacy of  White Australia policies. Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of  
Fear in an Anxious Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Kindle edition, 2012), pp. 17-18.
 Tim Soutphommasane, I’m Not Racist, But…: 40 Years of  the Racial Discrimination Act, (Sydney: New South 60
Publishing, 2015), p. 45.
 Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, ‘The Effects of  Civil Hate Speech Laws: Lessons from Australia’, Law 61
& Society Review 49, no. 3 (2015), p. 633, pp. 653-654.
 EMC, ‘Ban on Muslim Immigration’; EMC, ‘Reasons for Supporting Ban’.62
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May 2015); Tony Taylor, ‘Australia's 'Judeo-Christian heritage' doesn't exist’, The Guardian (13 January 2014). 
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I said that in this section that I would provide an overview of  the landscape of  Islamophobia 
in Australia. We can see that political fear of  Islam appears to stem from the belief  that Islam 
is at best “unenlightened”, at worst a threat to Australian values, identity, and physical 
security. But what is it about this political fear that makes it problematic for a pluralist liberal 
democracy? 
2.3 – The Belief  Profile of  Political Fear 
My ultimate argument is that this kind of  political fear is deeply problematic for liberal 
democracy and its stability because it is a narrowing and exclusionary emotion that corrupts 
citizens’ capacity to engage in communicative and cooperative democracy. Having established 
the nature of  political fear and grounded this investigation in a real-world example, I now 
want to defend my starting contention that this sort of  fear and its background beliefs are 
discriminatory. Once established, I will be able to more clearly show why fear is an 
unsustainable emotion in a liberal democracy: its impact on citizens and their communicative 
capacities precludes cooperative democratic participation. 
Here I use the term ‘discrimination’ in the sense of  prejudicial discrimination: negative 
differential attitudes towards or treatment of  an individual, group or class on the basis of  
their group-based identity, whether that identity is real or perceived.  The political fear of  64
Islam and Muslims that I have so far canvassed is prejudicially discriminatory in two ways. 
 On this definition, perceiving a Sikh man to be Muslim and treating him negatively on the basis of  that belief  64
is discriminatory on two levels. On one, the man is being treated in a negatively based on his perceived group 
identity. On a second, mis-categorising the Sikh man as Muslim might itself  be labelled discriminatory. Ironically 
enough, this is because someone makes an error of  ‘discrimination’ in its other sense: distinguishing between 
different stimuli. Thinking that all Muslims wear cloth on their heads is a prejudiced and indiscriminate (in the 
latter sense) assumption about some ‘foreign-looking’ people, and is thereby prejudicially discriminatory.
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First, it is grounded in a variety of  discriminatory beliefs. Second, these beliefs lend 
themselves to discrimination in practice.  
The beliefs I canvassed in section 2.2 exist on a spectrum of  undue prejudice. Fear of  Islam 
on the basis of  perceived treatment of  women is a fear based on prejudicial discrimination, 
for example. Though women are granted legal freedom and equality in Australia, there are 
clear inconsistencies in the objection to the burqa. Given that one woman a week in Australia 
dies at the hands of  a male known to them, it is at best inconsistent to claim that Australia has 
a robust commitment to the non-oppression of  women to which the hijab poses a threat.  65
Further, as Nussbaum points out, it is hypocritical to consider the hijab oppressive and not 
object to other norms of  female dress in Western cultures.  To assume that Muslim women 66
wear a head or face covering because a male forced them to, or out of  beliefs that the female 
form is shameful, is to a) ignore the same facts about many non-Muslim women’s clothing 
choices and b) believe that something which is true of  an oppressed subset of  a group is 
inherent to the practice. The fear of  Islam’s effect on Australia’s political culture for fear of  
inherent misogyny prejudicially discriminates against Islam.  
Islamophobia is also discriminatory when one’s beliefs ascribe negative characteristics to 
individuals or a group based on negative stereotypes. All Muslims are simply not terrorists, 
and Islam is not inherently a violent religion. On the very unreasonable end, this fear is 
grounded in the belief  that Islam is not a religion, but a front for a political ideology aimed at 
 Willow Bryant, Tracy Cussen, ‘Homicide in Australia: 2010–11 to 2011–12: National Homicide Monitoring 65
Program Report’, Australian Institute of  Criminology (February 2015).
 Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance, pp.125-132. Nussbaum mentions high heels, but perhaps a better 66
example is the G-string, which is hard to defend on the basis of  its artistic aesthetic. The G-string was invented 
by a man to maximally sexualise women in a public arena and now serves no purpose other than to reduce 
“panty lines”, presumably either because seeing the outline of  women’s underwear or the contours of  their fat 
deposits is unsightly or shameful. Ariel Levy, Female Chauvinist Pigs; Women and the Rise of  Raunch Culture, p. 142.
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‘taking over’ Western nations. Proponents of  this belief  point to violence and oppression in 
other areas of  the world, such as the Middle East, as evidence that Islam is anti-democratic. 
Others support this notion with invalid claims that the Qur’an prohibits democratic 
participation.  Fear of  a religion and its adherents based on stigmatisation extrapolated from 67
subsets of  a group is a discriminatory fear.  
It goes without saying that prejudicial discrimination is antithetical to a pluralist liberal 
society. Discrimination distances, excludes and subordinates its victims, creating hierarchical 
societies in which mistreatment is legitimised and institutionalised.  Discrimination advocates 68
inequality that is antithetical to the basis of  liberal democracy, and precludes citizens’ 
cooperation for common democratic ends. It involves a failure of  eudaimonic attitude that 
makes it difficult for citizens to see their fate in or alongside the fate of  Muslim Australians.  69
Because discrimination and fear are both grounded in exclusion, they feed on each other. 
when citizens fail to overcome difference and distance, and separation and discrimination take 
hold, fear of  the Other is self-perpetuating.  70
So far I have provided an account of  political fear of  Islam, its common belief-profiles, and 
shown those beliefs to be discriminatory. I now turn to considering the behavioural profile of  
political fear of  Islam in order to provide a fuller picture of  the damage done by fear in a 
 One Nation, ‘Policies; Islam’. As with any religious text written prior to modern democratic statehood, this 67
depends entirely on interpretation. One interpretation of  the Qur’an could (and does, in many sects and nations) 
interpret Shura – the Islamic guidance to make decisions and confront affairs in consultation with those affected 
by one’s decisions – as ensuring whole-hearted democratic participation and representation. Sadek J. Sulaiman, 
‘Democracy and Shura’, Liberal Islam (October 1998). 
 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, p. 122. 68
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liberal democracy. This will take us one step closer to appreciating why fear-mongering 
political rhetoric is objectionable.  
2.4 –The Behavioural Profile of  Political Fear 
Political fear is especially problematic given its potential range of  associated behaviours that 
undermine a democratic ethos committed to basic liberal values, such as the equality and 
freedoms of  fellow citizens. In this section, we will return to the behavioural profile of  fear 
outlined in section 2.1 to illuminate the connection between unreasonable fear of  minorities 
and discrimination. I find specific interest in the threat posed to pluralist democracies by fear’s 
relation to epistemic injustice. These connections will begin to demonstrate why fear-
mongering rhetoric is antithetical to the project of  cultivating a functioning democratic ethos. 
Recall the behavioural profile of  fear outlined in 2.1. Fear’s behaviours range from avoidance 
to paralysis and aggressive self-defence. Just as we saw with fear of  whales, unless citizens are 
very good at tempering their discriminatory beliefs, fear of  Islam will likely manifest as 
discriminatory behaviours towards Islam and Muslims. At a societal level, fear’s behaviours 
take the form of  laws, institutions and social practices that target a group or class of  people 
for negative differential treatment. These can include exclusionary immigration policies, the 
banning of  religious practices such as wearing the burqa, and prejudicial profiling of  a group. 
The call for a royal commission into whether Islam is a religion is an extreme example of  
this.  On an individual level, fear of  a group can present in a wide range of  behaviours. We 71
can imagine, for example, someone who becomes physically frozen when she serves a woman 
 One Nation, ‘Policies; Islam’. 71
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wearing a hijab at her place of  work because of  her background fear of  and hostility toward 
Islam. The ‘paralysing self-focus’ leads to a ‘narrowness in the way we construct our circle of  
concern’.  This in turn can result in errors of  compassion and therefore social and 72
institutional marginalisation of  the feared minority.  73
Aggressive fear-based behaviours are even more destructive to social cohesion and a 
democratic ethos. Just as someone’s fright might induce them to lash out at the dark shadow 
in the ocean, fear can and often does induce people to violent behavioural responses. Hateful 
and violent speech and actions directly undermine minorities’ freedom and equality and 
creates a public space in which their equal status as citizens is doubted. Groups such as the 
United Patriots Front and Reclaim Australia speak to their social media followers in 
combative, ‘us vs. them’ language, warning Australians to ‘steel yourselves and prepare, unite 
under the flag of  your Nation’ against Muslims.  Incidents of  outright violence, aggression 74
and verbal abuse toward Muslims are not uncommon in Australia.  75
There is a further range of  fear-based behaviours that I want to argue are particularly 
problematic for a functioning liberal democracy. They are the behaviours that Miranda 
Fricker and José Medina have called epistemic vices and injustices.  I will proceed to argue 76
through the rest of  this thesis that citizens’ free, equal and meaningful political discourse is 
 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, pp. 264-265. 72
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quelled by the epistemic vices and injustices of  political fear and its rhetoric. This is an aspect 
of  fear’s problematic nature that Nussbaum has not addressed. This contribution extends her 
work into the realm of  epistemic injustice and resistance, while also combining it with 
contemporary speech act theory where helpful and appropriate.   
We can get an even deeper understanding of  fear if  we acknowledge that its discriminatory 
behaviours are sustained and reinforced by poor epistemic practices. Epistemic vices ‘are deep 
and serious flaws in epistemic character that limit the subject’s learning capacities and 
contributions to the pursuit of  knowledge.’  Fricker and Medina point out that often, these 77
failings reflect and reinforce other forms of  discrimination, drawing on existing imbalances of  
authority and stigmatising heuristics.  I contend that this is true of  and crucial to 78
discriminatory fear of  Islam and Muslims. Political fear thus results in several politically 
relevant epistemic behaviours. Medina speaks of  epistemic vices he calls object-level and 
meta-level blindness about Others.  These can come about in a variety of  ways; laziness, lack 79
of  exposure to the group one is blind to, or prejudicial refusal to learn about that group. I 
think when it comes to fear’s epistemic vices, the latter cause is most likely. Let me provide 
examples of  Islamophobic beliefs to explain object- and meta-level blindness more fully.  
An example of  object-level blindness caused by fear of  Islam would be the perception that all 
Muslim women wear a headscarf  because a male relative forced them to; it is ignorance 
about a detail pertaining to Muslims. Meta-level blindness, however, is displayed in data that 
says the majority of  non-Muslim Australians grossly misestimate the number of  Muslims in 
 Medina, The Epistemology of  Resistance, p. 31. 77
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Australia.  They are almost entirely blind to the groups around them.  When Islamophobic 80 81
beliefs take the form of  such blindness, the epistemic failing can be diagnosed as a symptom 
of  fear’s harms upon the fearful agent qua knower.  
They are also harms against the subject of  the fear. An example of  this presents itself  in the 
discrediting of  Muslim women as speakers based on the idea that they are not allowed to 
speak their own minds.  This is a poor epistemic behaviour caused by fear’s self-centring 82
effects on our cognitive practices. It is also an example of  what Fricker identifies as a testimonial 
injustice – the injustice perpetrated against an individual qua knower when, because of  
prejudice, hearers afford a speaker less credibility than they deserve.  I will return to the 83
injustice of  this later on, but for now we should note that this injustice reinforces the epistemic 
failings of  fear. When our ignorance and poor epistemic practices are thus compounded, it 
can lead to the formation of  ‘cognitive lacunae’ – capacious holes in one’s knowledge – about 
those one perceives to be a threat.  Letting one’s beliefs go unchecked by authoritative 84
sources – such as Muslims themselves – ‘results in an unavoidable, mundane accumulation of  
oversights, errors, biased stereotypes and distortions.’  But it can also result in an inability to 85
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identify others’ relevance to our own lives and circle of  concern.  In Nussbaum’s terms, this 86
is a failure of  eudaimonic epistemic practice. 
When these epistemic failings are reproduced throughout a community, fear can ‘damage the 
social knowledge available and harm the chances for epistemic improvement of  the subject’s 
community.’  Such discriminatory ignorance and close-mindedness precludes the 87
sympathetic tendencies and inclusive social values required for a functioning democratic 
ethos. Given fear’s cognitive nature, our epistemic practices are especially warped by 
prejudicial fear. In an unfortunate cycle, such fear is ‘augmented by… inward-looking 
exclusionary attitudes that [deny] fellowship.’  Nussbaum notes that fear is ‘very recalcitrant 88
to learning and moral thinking,’ but does not extend this thought to an analysis of  fear’s 
epistemic vices and injustices, such as I have done here.  Understanding fear’s damaging 89
epistemic components will shed light on why fear-mongering rhetoric is damaging to citizens’ 
discursive capacities. 
In this section I have shown that when fear dominates our thinking, it precludes our ability to 
extend basic freedoms and equality to all.  We should want to consider, therefore, what role 90
the state plays in cultivating or ameliorating such fear. In the next section, I do this by turning 
to the role of  fear-mongering political rhetoric in liberal democracy. I want to show that this 
 Ibid, p. 154-161. I also wrote on this issue in partial completion of  the Bachelor of  Arts (Honours) for Dr. 86
Moira Gatens’ seminar titled ‘Reimagining Epistemology’. In that paper I developed and advocated a social 
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work of  Iris Marion Young and the test case of  the global garment manufacturing industry. It was titled ‘In the 
Thick of  It; A Social Connection Model of  Epistemic Responsibility’. 
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kind of  discriminatory, fear-mongering speech leads to an array of  harms and injustices 
against citizens, and that these harms are mediated by political fear. In other words, I want to 
contend that there is an intimate connection between the belief  profile of  political fear, and a 
host of  speech-based phenomena that undermine the communicative environment crucial for 
the functioning of  a liberal democracy. Specifically, I contribute to this field of  political 
philosophy by arguing that fear-mongering rhetoric undermines citizens’ capacity to 
communicate equally and meaningfully in the realm of  political discourse. Fear fatally 
undermines the project of  cultivating a functioning democratic ethos.  
THREE – FEAR-MONGERING SPEECH 
What does fear mongering speech do? What are its effects? The answers to these questions 
largely turn on the authority with which politicians speak. Considering these questions reveals 
the important role that political leaders can play in the emotional well-being of  a nation and 
its commitment to a functioning democratic ethos. I draw on the work of  contemporary 
speech act theorists to identify the speech-based phenomena that distribute and perpetuate 
fear’s damaging properties. This will get us one step closer to seeing how rhetoric actually 
impedes citizens’ free speech. It silences minorities, reinforces discrimination, and 
compromises citizens’ ability to effectively communicate with one another.  
3.1 – Speaking with Authority 
By virtue of  their social position as democratically elected officials, politicians in liberal 
democracies occupy a place of  ‘positional authority’.  Part of  this authority is a privileged 91
 For ease, I use ‘politicians’ to refer to those already elected and those seeking election. The term ‘positional 91
authority’ is taken from Ishani Maitra, ‘Subordinating Speech’ in Maitra and McGowan [Eds], Speech and Harm: 
Controversies over Free Speech, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 105. 
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platform from which to speak. Caroline West has demonstrated that the ability to easily and 
widely distribute one’s speech and have it ‘attended to and considered by others’ is essential to 
having one’s speech successfully do what one wants.  Distribution is easy if  not guaranteed; a 92
politician in the modern media landscape of  Twitter, 24/7 news broadcasts, and live video 
streaming can address their constituents at any moment.  On top of  that, we collectively 93
grant speaking power to politicians because we appraise their speech as relevant to the success 
of  our nation and responsible to their constituents. This is why politicians’ speech also 
receives significant consideration.   94
Achieving minimal consideration of  one’s speech also requires being taken seriously enough 
to have one’s words count for something. Fricker points out that as hearers, we make 
‘spontaneous credibility judgements’ all the time that determine the authority we afford 
speakers.  I contend that even where we don’t attribute a high amount of  credibility to a 95
politician we disagree with, reaching political office confers enough credibility on the politician 
to have their speech count in the public discursive environment – the ‘national 
conversation’.  This is because all democratically elected politicians derive a measure of  96
credibility from having a threshold number of  citizens vote for them. George Brandis (and 
others) have appealed to this credibility to defend Senator Hanson’s right to say 
discriminatory and fear-mongering things. She is perceived as credible by virtue of  having 
 Caroline West, ‘Words That Silence? Freedom of  Expression and Racist Hate Speech’ in Maitra and 92
McGowan[Eds], p. 245. 
 Some, including the editor-at-large of  The Australian, have claimed that Senator Hanson, by virtue of  her 93
controversial nature, was the beneficiary of  an excess of  free media time during the 2016 federal election 
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received the votes of  ‘hundreds of  thousands of  Australian electors’.  Hearers are not alone 97
in using this marker of  authority. Politicians themselves draw upon the epistemic privilege of  
political office to claim credibility. 
It’s worth noting that some politicians do not solely rely on the authority inherent to political 
office. The kind of  speaker I am interested in here derives a large part of  their testimonial 
credibility from unconventional markers of  expertise in politics. Hanson, for example, relies 
on the fact that she isn’t ingratiated with the political classes and their norms of  discourse to 
cultivate credibility with relevant hearers. She is seen as ‘real’ and ‘one of  us’, eschewing 
‘political correctness’ to speak uncomfortable truths.  98
Even where citizens do not automatically perceive the speaker to be credible, their speech 
often receives derived credibility when it is licensed as legitimate political discourse by more 
credible speakers.  When Senator George Brandis (as Attorney-General, a quintessentially 99
authoritative speaker) claims that Hanson should be listened to, he licenses her speech as 
credible political discourse. It is framed as one legitimate opinion among many and she is thus 
in a position to claim that Australians have cause to fear Islam.  As we have seen, such 100
claims are discriminatory and discrimination itself  is antithetical to liberal democracy. But in 
addition to adding the content of  the speech to our national conversation, failing to reject 
fear-mongering as a style of  rhetoric adds that style of  rhetoric to our norms of  political 
discourse. Senator Brandis qualified his defence of  Senator Hanson’s speech by objecting to 
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its content. He did not, however, object to its mode of  expression. This both confers 
credibility on fear-mongering as a mode of  political discussion, and licenses fear as a tolerable 
public emotion. In the next section I will further unpack why this is unsustainable in a liberal 
democracy. 
Even if  Senator Hanson’s epistemic authority is unconventional, what matters for the felicity 
of  politicians’ speech is whether it is ‘authoritative in the domain that counts’ and 
‘authoritative for the hearers that count.’  Given her recent electoral success, we can assume 101
that her speech is authoritative with a significant enough number of  relevant hearers. Her success 
demonstrates that positional and epistemic authority gives politicians’ speech a greater chance 
of  achieving its ends. In this case, Senator Hanson has a better chance of  convincing voters 
that they have reason to fear Islam. 
3.2 – Why Fear-Mongering Speech Is Problematic 
Contemporary speech act theorists have shown us that because speech takes place in contexts 
of  power, authority and prejudice, ‘people manage to do all kinds of  things with words’.  In 102
this section, I assess what discriminatory, fear-mongering speech does to a liberal democracy; 
what sorts of  things these words do. I argue that these words define the nation and what 
threatens it in such a way that minorities are silenced, oppressed and precluded from equally 
participating in political discourse and the shaping of  our national identity. Further, it 
legitimises fear as a political emotion and fear-mongering as a legitimate contribution to 
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political discourse. Because of  fear’s effects on our society and citizens’ democratic 
communication, I argue that this should not be accepted in the name of  ‘freedom of  speech’. 
We don’t instinctively believe the kinds of  things that make us perceive threats to the nation. 
Rather, we ‘learn from our society what is helpful and harmful’ to it ‘in ways that go well 
beyond evolutionary biology, and we then attach our fear mechanism to that conception.’  103
As Nussbaum points out, ‘national identity is a deliberate construct’ and political rhetoric 
plays a significant role in that construction. This is why prejudicial fear-mongering speech is 
problematic. It aims to define the nation as P and a particular group as ~P, or as ‘a threat to 
P’. It does so by ‘constructing the perception of  danger where it does not’ actually exist.   104
Consider the following example. In her first press conference after the 2016 Federal Election, 
Pauline Hanson was explicit in defining the nation and what threatens it.  ‘We are a 105
Christian country,’ she declared. As a part of  ‘our values, our way of  life, our culture’ (an 
ambiguously defined P) ‘you don't have a full burqa’ and you ‘don't keep putting up mosques.’ 
(~P). Senator Hanson went goes further than defining Islam as a negation of  ‘Australia’. She 
claimed that either the practice of  Islam already in Australia, or else by increased Muslim 
immigration, ‘will actually destroy our culture and our way of  life’ (threat-to-P). 
This act of  defining Australia as P and Islam as threat-to-P constructs Islam and its practice 
as something to be feared, automatically excluding Muslims from the Australian national 
identity. It thereby ranks and subordinates them as less legitimate citizens. When politicians 
 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, p.321. 103
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claim that increased Muslim migration will increase the occurrence of  terrorist attacks in 
Australia, ‘the speaker aims to mark their target as a terrorist and an undesirable, and in so 
doing, to rank her as inferior to others.’  This is problematic regardless of  its effects on 106
citizens or their behaviour. Fear-mongering from a place of  authority undermines the public 
virtues to which a liberal society is supposedly committed: openness, toleration, compassion 
and publicly accepted standards of  political discourse. Discrimination, meanwhile, is by 
definition a rejection of  the principles of  liberty and equality for all. To encourage fear and 
discrimination is to reject the kind of  ethos that I explored in Section 1. But fear-mongering 
political rhetoric is especially problematic because it has the authority to be heard, taken 
seriously, and therefore to shape citizens’ beliefs. 
When politicians use their privileged speech to portray a minority as a threat to the nation, 
and it is accepted into our discursive community as a legitimate style of  speaking, fear is 
normalised within public political discourse.  The concern here is that if  fear-mongering is 107
licensed as a mode of  political discussion, it will incite fear-based behaviours because fear has 
‘been made legitimate in [the relevant] arena of  activity’: political discourse.  I have already 108
mentioned polls from 2016 in which 49% of  respondents were inclined to restrict Muslim 
immigration to Australia. This poll was reported as suggesting that Senator Hanson’s anti-
Islamic rhetoric had an impact on public perceptions of  the Islam’s connection with 
terrorism, and its compatibility with Australian political culture.  Restricting Muslim 109
immigration would be an extreme avoidance-type fear behaviour indeed. Similarly, around 
 Maitra, ‘Subordinating Speech’, p. 115.106
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the time of  the Abbott Government's call for a ban on women wearing burqas into 
Parliament House, aggressive, fear-based behaviours seemed to increase in the public sphere. 
Media outlets and Islamic community organisations noted increased reports of  discriminatory 
speech acts and behaviours against Muslim women wearing Islamic headdress, including 
attempts to pull it off  them.  These examples suggest that politicians’ repeated acts of  110
defining Islam as a threat has a very real impact on citizens’ fear – or perhaps at least on their 
willingness to express their fear openly. 
The effects I have so far considered have largely been on individual citizens’ attitudes toward 
Islam and Australia. But discriminatory, fear-mongering political speech can also create 
fearful, exclusionary social imaginaries about our national identity. Following Aristotle’s work 
in Rhetoric, Nussbaum points out that political rhetoric is crucial in shaping social imaginaries 
and therefore emotional attitudes toward the nation.  Political classes’ conceptions of  the 111
nation and what is good for it significantly contribute to the social imaginary – ‘the repository 
of  images and scripts that become collectively shared’ in a group or society – and thereby 
play a role in shaping citizens’ own attitudes about nationhood and identity.  When 112
politicians espouse fear-mongering definitions like ‘Islam is a threat to our culture and way of  
life’ repeatedly, the social imaginary itself  can become one in which the nation is exclusionary 
and anti-liberal.  Ideas like “Muslims do not integrate well” become widely assumed as 113
background knowledge.   114
 Heath Aston, 'Dozens of  Anti-Muslim Attacks as Islamic Leaders warn of  Community Fear’, Sydney Morning 110
Herald, (9 October 2014). 
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Earlier I argued that political fear of  Muslims is objectionable on the grounds that defining 
Muslims as a threat to nation also renders them non-credible on issues of  national identity, 
security and political culture. When Muslims suffer this epistemic injustice, citizens’ full 
democratic participation and discussion is quelled. On this issue, West, Langton and Fricker 
dovetail. Their work can be combined to show how the silencing of  Muslims is an injustice 
borne out of  (and perpetuating) epistemic injustice, perpetrated by more powerful speakers’ fear-
mongering speech. When a speaker suffers the testimonial injustice of  a credibility deficit 
described by Fricker, she is afforded less credibility than she deserves because of  a hearer’s 
prejudice, namely, fear-based discrimination. West refers to this kind of  injustice as a 
‘consideration failure’: ‘the audience grasps what the speaker means to say perfectly well, but 
ignores it or dismisses it out of  hand because they believe the speaker is not the kind of  
person worth listening to.’  Following MacKinnon and Langton, I would argue that this is 115
an act of  silencing Muslims.  When Muslims are marked as a threat to national security and 116
identity, they are rendered non-credible on those subjects, and therefore incapable of  speaking 
in meaningful ways. “We don’t endorse violent terrorism”, for example, is not taken as 
testimony against P: “Islam is violent.” The injustice of  this silencing lies in its prejudicial 
nature. Muslims are precluded from ‘receiving the fair hearing required to challenge these 
attitudes’ because others’ discriminatory beliefs about Islam render them less credible than is 
warranted.   117
 West, ‘Words that Silence?’ p. 243. 115
 This silencing argument contends that by ranking women, pornography renders some of  their speech acts 116
unspeakable in the sense that their speech is precluded from performing certain actions (consenting, or declining 
consent, for example). See: Langton, p. 299. 
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Let me clarify this with a real example. On an episode of  QandA, Randa Abdel-Fattah made 
a series of  comments about the connection between the history of  Western intervention in the 
Middle-East and anti-Western Islamic radicalisation.  Soon after, her local Federal MP sent 118
an e-mail newsletter to his constituents condemning her comments as extreme ‘anti-Western 
and anti-Australian conspiracy theories.’  Her comments expressed a not-uncommon view 119
that has been expressed by non-Muslim commentators, and yet it was perceived as a threat.  120
Speaking as a Muslim woman, Abdel-Fattah observed, her ‘very agency and ability to speak is 
questioned’, based on prejudicial ideas about what it is to be a ‘moderate’ Muslim.  Abdel-121
Fattah’s ability to meaningfully and equally participate in national discourse was undermined 
when her speech read as extremist and ‘anti-Australian’. This instance demonstrates that fear 
for one’s nation can result in a series of  epistemic injustices against minorities, who are 
rendered incapable of  equally participating in national discourse. 
When groups within a society are unable to contribute to political discourse in meaningful 
ways, our collective self-imagining as a nation can become increasingly constructed in the 
absence of  their contributions. It therefore becomes easier to frame them as a threat, and to 
manipulate society’s fear of  that threat. Discriminatory, fear-mongering speech thus ‘functions 
to reproduce and reinforce’ citizens’ fear, hostility and contempt toward Muslims.  At the 122
same time, fear-mongering rhetoric protects such discrimination ‘from challenge by sapping 
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 Abdel-Fattah, ‘What I Couldn't Say’.119
 Seumas Milne, Now the truth emerges: how the US fuelled the rise of  Isis in Syria and Iraq’, The Guardian, 4 120
June 2015. 
 Listening to Abdel-Fattah’s speech, it is hard to think she is unaware of  Langton’s argument about 121
illocutionary disablement. Abdel-Fattah, ‘What I Couldn't Say’.
 West, ‘Words that Silence?’, p. 245. 122
!  39
the power of  minority speech to contest it.’  Muslims are silenced by fear-mongering 123
speech, and thereby not afforded an equal position in political discourse, leaving a dangerous 
space in society for fear and exclusion to reinforce each other. 
In other words, politicians’ fear-mongering speech has the consequence of  rendering Muslims 
less credible than they are, by virtue of  fear’s epistemically narrowing effects on non-Muslim 
citizens. Muslims as a result are unable to speak in ways that might work against such 
prejudice and fear, reinforcing their marginalisation and exclusion from the nation’s political 
discourse and self-imagining. So while politicians are able to achieve widespread 
consideration by virtue of  their social position, Muslims, as victims of  testimonial injustice, 
cannot use their words to do the things they intend, such as define themselves as part of  the 
national identity or testify that their religion is not a threat to our pluralist democracy.  124
So far I have demonstrated how political rhetoric goes about defining Australia as P and 
Islam as a threat-to-P. When this is done, and licensed, by authoritative speakers, it can shape 
society’s social imaginary in ways that convince citizens that Islam poses a threat to Australian 
political culture. Further, defining Muslims as a threat to that national identity renders them 
non-credible speakers on topics of  national identity and security. They are rendered unequal 
speakers in the national political discourse. These harms perpetrated against citizens when 
politicians speak in discriminatory, fear-mongering ways are the result and the support 
mechanism of  political fear. My contribution to the turn to ethics has been to extend 
Nussbaum’s account of  political fear to a specific consideration of  the harms perpetrated 
against citizens, and liberal democracy, by fear-mongering speech. This kind of  rhetoric 
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manipulates the self-centred and short-sighted nature of  fear’s behavioural and belief  profiles. 
When it does this, it divides societies and damages the epistemic and discursive community 
that exists within a liberal democracy. The damage fear does to our communicative 
environments is magnified by fear’s epistemically stunting effects on non-Muslim citizens; 
cognitive biases and lacunae take hold, and Muslims are further excluded from our sense of  
self  as a nation. 
In this section I have largely been considering the effects of  fear-mongering political speech 
on individual and social fear of  Islam, and why these effects are problematic. In the 
remainder of  this section, I will briefly identify two more significant, and somewhat less 
abstract, consequences of  fear-mongering rhetoric. This will get us to a point where we can 
begin weighing up the value of  this style of  political speech against what it does to citizens, 
their discourse, and the foundations of  a functioning democracy. 
One significant concern about fear-mongering speech is that, by virtue of  legitimising 
discrimination against minorities, it can increase the prevalence of  the discriminatory 
behaviours I outlined in section 2.4.  Determining whether this is the case is largely an 125
empirical question. In the wake of  the September 11 terrorist attacks, Arab and Muslim 
Australians reported the impression that ‘members of  the wider community felt that it was 
acceptable to engage in verbal abuse toward them, in part because political leaders were also 
doing so.’  If  politicians are successful in causing fear of  a minority group, it seems likely 126
that fear will be legitimised as a public emotion and as a mode of  political expression. We 
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should not discount the possibility that fear-mongering rhetoric has the real potential to cause 
further discrimination.  
I earlier demonstrated that fear-mongering rhetoric can silence Muslims by discrediting their 
attempts to meaningfully contribute to political discourse. But discriminatory, fear-mongering 
rhetoric can silence minorities in less abstract terms. Matsuda describes the psychological and 
physiological impact of  hate speech on victims as ‘devastating’.  Victims internalise 127
discriminatory depictions directed at them, feelings of  shame and non-belonging, in turn 
leading to a sense of  dispossession and alienation from their society.  While discriminatory, 128
fear-mongering rhetoric is not hate speech, it is difficult to imagine how an Australian Muslim 
could avoid the psychological and epistemic effects of  controversial and much-reported 
politicians’ fear-mongering rhetoric. Matsuda’s observation that ‘victims become stateless 
when their government does not come to their defense but actively protects the people 
alienating them from their own society’ supports my point here.  These consequences are 129
likely be intensified by a severe magnitude when a government is the source of  minorities’ 
marginalisation. This kind of  silencing is part of  the ‘psychic tax’ paid by minorities for 
having been defined as a threat to their own society.  Political fear is the perpetrator of  130
minorities’ subordination, including as speakers in a nation’s political discourse, and it is 
distributed by fear-mongering political rhetoric.  
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Clarifying the effects of  discriminatory, fear-mongering speech on citizens and society equips 
us with a better understanding of  the stakes when we get to the central problem of  this thesis: 
whether such speech should be defended or discouraged. The novelty of  my contribution in 
this thesis has been to pinpoint the specific cognitive and behavioural characteristics of  fear as 
the objectionable force behind fear-mongering speech and its consequences for a liberal 
democracy. In particular, I’ve highlighted fear’s epistemic vices and injustices as the crucible 
of  fear’s corrosive effects on democratic participation and stability.  
Once we pay attention to the emotional engine of  fear-mongering rhetoric, we can behind to 
ask questions about its further effects. I turn to these in the next section. What is starting to 
emerge is a strong connection between political fear and the destruction of  citizens’ 
communicative capacities and environments, and therefore healthy and stable democratic 
participation. 
FOUR – BALANCING INTERESTS 
In this final chapter, I consider a number of  arguments made in defence of  discriminatory, 
fear-mongering rhetoric in Australia’s political discourse. These claim that we should 
withstand and even listen to Islamophobic political speech in name of  being a tolerant society 
committed to freedom of  expression and democratic representation. I argue against this. 
Political fear’s caustic nature means that this speech does not achieve the benefits promised by 
liberal freedom of  speech principles. Rather, defending this privileged style of  speech requires 
sacrificing citizens’ communicative freedoms and capacities in a way that should make us 
deeply uncomfortable. 
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So far I've mostly discussed the harms done to people by fear-mongering rhetoric. Objections 
of  this sort have historically proven unpersuasive to free speech theorists of  a certain bent, 
who hear reports of  harms and silencing to speakers and reply that these harms are not 
significant enough to trump the principle of  "free speech".  I now want to consider a second 131
species of  harm that may prove more persuasive to these people; the harm done not to 
speakers but to the very communicative environment that ought to justify a free speech 
principle in the first place. 
4.1 – For Truth and Progress’ Sake 
I give prominence to John Stuart Mill’s defence of  free speech because variations of  his 
argument have been employed in Australian discourse to defend politicians’ ‘right’ to express 
discriminatory and fear-mongering views.  Mill’s is certainly a powerful defence of  citizens’ 132
right to freedom of  expression. But it’s not clear that politicians’ discriminatory, fear-
mongering speech results in the epistemic and social benefits Mill idealised. In the previous 
section, I explored some effects of  such speech on citizens. Here I’ll show that those effects 
serve as evidence of  a broader harm at play: significant damage to our epistemic and 
discursive environment as a nation.   
Free speech theoretically allows for free discussion. Mill argued that this in turn facilitates 
societies’ greater capacity to discover truth and opens us up to the social and moral progress 
 This is a broad school of  thought perhaps epitomised by Ronald Dworkin. 131
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associated with greater epistemic flourishing.  Through the clash of  opinions, we find 133
opportunities to correct others, and where that is not possible, we at least refine our own 
reasons for holding our views. We enjoy the epistemic benefits of  regular and robust 
debate.   134
This defence of  free speech as a path to epistemic and social progress operates on the 
assumption that speakers are equally situated in political discourse, and that they are treated 
as such. In the vein of  Mill, it is often said that the antidote to objectionable speech is “more 
speech”. But talking about speech in this way obfuscates the fact that speech can ‘deeply and 
grievously wound’ individuals and societies.  In reality, “more speech” doesn’t happen. 135
Minorities are not able to contribute to national discourse on an equal platform, as I 
demonstrated in section 3. Fear-mongering speech silences and marginalises minorities as 
knowers and speakers to such an extent that they do not receive a fair hearing in the national 
conversation. They cannot, therefore, respond to discriminatory speech or participate in 
political discourse on an equal footing. It seems unlikely that we will reap the social and 
epistemic benefits of  debate when some groups are prevented from speaking in meaningful 
ways that would constitute free democratic discussion.  136
Mill’s defence of  free speech is predicated on a second assumption that publicly justifiable 
reasons are being given for peoples’ claims, and that people are engaged in coherent 
discourse. But discriminatory fear-mongering rhetoric doesn’t engage in a practice of  broadly 
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acceptable reason-giving. Without supporting reasons, Senator Lambie claimed that a violent 
form of  Sharia law is being rolled out in Australian communities by ‘maniacs’ who will rape 
and murder ‘until every woman in Australia wears a burka[sic].’  When Senator Lambie’s 137
misunderstanding of  Sharia law was pointed out to her, she reiterated her original statements 
without acknowledging error or justifying her claims.  We can disagree with Senator 138
Lambie, point out her lack of  reasons, and provide our own to the contrary. But if  she does 
not agree that reason-giving is essential to public discourse, these efforts will have 
questionable effect on either her or us. They will do little to help us access ‘the truth’ of  the 
matter. Senator Lambie appeared to either fail to consider the reasons provided to her, or 
refused to accept publicly justifiable reason-giving as an essential background assumption of  
our political discursive environment. Whichever is true, we do not achieve the epistemic and 
social progress that we try to protect when we defend free democratic discourse. This is 
because the epistemic vices that fear induces in individuals cause a severe divergence of  
discursive standards. I will return to this, my final point, shortly.  
No future state of  epistemic or social flourishing is guaranteed when we are not engaging in 
epistemically beneficial reason-giving, or when some speakers cannot be heard. Tolerating 
politicians’ discriminatory, fear-mongering speech requires ‘that we endure whatever pain 
[their] speech inflicts for the sake of  a future whose emergence we can only take on faith.’  139
Part of  that pain is the chilling effects of  political fear on our communities’ speech: silencing 
citizens’ meaningful speech and ability to exchange ideas free from epistemic distortion and 
injustice. 
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4.2 – Democratic Expression 
Another common defence of  discriminatory, fear-mongering political speech is the idea that it 
is a non-negotiable fact of  democratic representation. Senator Brandis defended Hanson’s 
comments about Islam by pointing out that ‘the point of  view she represents is a point of  
view supported by hundreds of  thousands of  the Australian people and they are entitled to 
have their views respected.’  People make this argument because we value citizens’ 140
democratic expression as the backbone of  democracy. The greater the representation of  
citizens’ views in government, the greater the integrity of  our democracy.  
There are two preliminary comments to be made about why this reason for valuing freedom 
of  speech does not apply to politicians’ discriminatory and fear-mongering speech acts. First of  
all, opposing fear-mongering rhetoric isn’t an attempt to limit citizens’ speech, the right to 
express one’s views to political representatives, or the entitlement to be listened to and 
represented in parliament. It is a comment only on a certain type of  speech by a certain type of  
speaker. Second, there are ways for citizens’ views to be represented without politicians 
engaging in speech that is corrosive to liberal democracy. Discriminatory, fear-mongering 
political speech is a style of  rhetoric. Its content can conceivably be expressed without speaking 
in ways that discriminate or manipulate a corrosive emotion from a privileged platform (‘My 
constituents have reported to me that they are feeling…’). Further, as Stanley Fish points out; 
the only places in which people can sound off  without consequence are artificially cordoned 
off  spaces.  In our parliamentary democracy, we have created such a space for politicians: 141
parliament, where their speech is protected by parliamentary privilege. There are both ways 
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and places of  honouring citizens’ views – even the more anti-democratic ones – without 
performing and propagating acts of  discrimination and subversion oneself.  
More substantially, I would point out that valuing speech as a means to democratic expression 
is the reason we don’t actually protect absolute freedom of  speech. In Australia, no one has the 
right to discriminate against others on the basis of  group-based identity, because this comes 
into conflict with other citizens’ democratic participation. Because speech does things and takes 
place within contexts of  power and privilege, ‘sooner or later, you will come to a point when 
you will decide that some forms of  speech do not further but endanger’ the purpose of  
democratic expression.  We value certain standards of  public discourse in part because they 142
ensure that all citizens get a voice in the national conversation. Discriminatory, fear-
mongering speech rejects those standards and marginalises and even silences the input of  
minority groups. In short, discriminatory fear and its rhetoric ‘exclude minorities from 
participating in the contemplation of  public issues because their concerns are discounted by 
the majority and because they have been demoralised by repeated victimisation.’  If  we 143
accept this consequence, we are prioritising a corrosive and anti-democratic mode of  
speaking over minorities’ equal democratic expression. 
 4.3 – Harms 
One justification for restricting speech is the ‘harm principle’.  In modern liberal 144
democracies, it has been interpreted as a restriction on speech that directly incites violence or 
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hate. But because all speech does things, harm is not only caused by “fighting words”. In this 
last section, I consider a second class of  harms caused by Australian politicians’ 
discriminatory, fear-mongering speech: harms to citizens’ ability to have the democratic 
conversations that freedom of  speech principles try to protect. I conclude that these harms 
should not be accepted as long-term collateral for the short-term ‘benefit’ of  protecting a 
corrosive and avoidable mode of  speech.  
4.3.1 – Tangible harms to minorities 
I have already outlined the landscape of  harm inflicted upon Muslims in Australia by fear-
mongering rhetoric. If  we license such speech, we are prioritising a style of  political rhetoric over 
minorities’ rights, speech, and wellbeing. In any society grounded on citizens’ equal liberties, 
equal rights and ability to speak freely, this should be cause for deep concern. Yet pointing out 
harms to minorities has traditionally failed to convince those committed to a broad 
interpretation of  freedom of  speech principles. I therefore return to considering another 
category of  harms perpetrated by fear-mongering speech that may be more convincing to 
those who strive to protect citizens’ ability to speak freely, and meaningfully.  
4.3.2 – Damage to Discursive Community and Democratic Ethos 
The turn to ethics within political philosophy aims to find a way of  securing citizens’ 
commitment to fundamental liberal values and virtues, and a political culture of  inclusion, 
compassion and care for the nation. In this final section, I argue that the overriding — and 
perhaps most significant — objection to fear-mongering speech is the trauma done to citizens’ 
democratic discursive environments by political fear. Licensing fear-mongering rhetoric does 
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not protect freedom of  speech for citizens’ sake, but fatally wounds citizens’ capacity to 
communicate effectively enough to collaboratively care for the nation.  
First, this thesis has explored a variety of  ways in which Islamophobic political speech silences 
Muslims by preventing their speech from doing things available to other citizens. Their words 
cannot act as legitimate contribution to political discourse and imaginings of  Australian 
identity, for example. When Muslims’ ability to testify about national identity and welfare is 
undermined in this way, they suffer a testimonial injustice that renders them unequal speakers 
in the national conversation. Fear, and its propagation through authoritative political rhetoric, 
silences some citizens’ speech is thereby suppressed, if  not silenced. In other words: fear-
mongering rhetoric functions to suppress, not protect, citizens’ speech.  We should object to 145
this given that it is citizens, not politicians, whose democratic voices we aim to protect. 
There is a second way in which political fear undermines citizens’ freedom of  expression: by 
fracturing our discursive community beyond a point of  meaningful democratic 
communication. When we reflect on the effects of  fear as culminating in this foundational 
harm, we can see why fear-mongering rhetoric seems to polarise and disable citizens’ political 
discourse. Fish observes that ‘freedom [of  speech] has never been general and has always 
been understood against the background of  an originary exclusion that gives it meaning.’  146
The functioning of  democratic political discourse is predicated on public and mutual 
assumption of  a set of  basic norms like “citizens’ speech is paramount”, “discrimination is 
wrong”, and “politicians should give good reasons for the things they say, because they are 
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representing sovereign citizens.”  Generally, one must accept these norms in order to be 147
taken seriously as a speaker within a society that is committed to citizens’ sovereignty, freedom 
and equality. But sometimes when someone rejects these norms, their speech still manages to 
find an accepting community. 
Sometimes this happens because speakers are licensed by other speakers and hearers, as seen 
in Section 3.1. Their speech is thereby either added to the background assumptions of  our 
discursive environment, or accepted by another discursive community within our society, 
whose norms of  discourse and treatment of  minority groups are antithetical to our own. This 
is the other part of  the ‘discourse’ problem in Australia. For a long time, fear of  others was 
the foundation stone of  Australian political discourse and identity-based exclusion the 
backbone of  Australia’s self-identification. The phenomenon of  politicians saying 
discriminatory, fear-mongering things has not long been among the ‘originary exclusions’ that 
give our political discourse meaning. Rejection of  group-based discrimination has developed 
recently, and inconsistently  Further, as noted as several junctions throughout this thesis, 148
Australian political culture is yet to settle on a conception of  ‘the nation’ — i.e., what it is we 
are trying to protect — as distinct from racial, religious and ethnic identities.  
 Even if  we reject the most famous account of  public reason, Rawls’, we can minimally accept that the nature 147
of  democracy depends on giving adequate reasons for our political claims and actions to others with whom we 
exist in cooperative society, and that our public discourse is bound within the basic normative commitments of  
our society: citizens’ equalities of  freedom, dignity and access to goods. Political speech that disregards or 
undermines those norms operates outside the boundaries of  meaningful speech.
 For example in the wake of  the Racial Discrimination Act of  1975 and the dismantling of  official White 148
Australia policies in the 70’s and 80’s. But legislation will not (cannot) ‘transform a political culture.’ Indeed, it 
was not enough to prevent the rise of  xenophobic public discourse and behaviour toward Asian migrants in the 
1990’s, or the Cronulla Riots of  2005. Soutphommasane, “I’m Not Racist, But…”, pp. 76-80. 
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Speech ‘is always produced within the precincts of  some assumed conception of  the good to 
which it must yield in the event of  conflict.’  But the self-absorbing effects of  fear throw our 149
conceptions of  the nation, what is good for it and who can credibly speak about its welfare 
into question. With them go the previously accepted norms that give our political 
conversation meaning. When this inability to settle on the purpose of  political discourse is 
combined with the epistemic vices and injustices perpetrated by fear, it is unsurprising that 
conflicting but legitimised discursive communities have emerged within the one political 
society. Sometimes this problem manifests in a lack of  minimally adequate reason-giving for 
one’s political claims, and at others in the expression of  speech directly antithetical to the 
aims of  a pluralist liberal democracy. Fear exponentially exacerbates our inability to agree on 
a conception of  ‘the good’ and its solipsistic and exclusionary nature makes us less likely to 
perceive each other as credible speakers. If  we fundamentally disagree, or are even threatened 
by what others are trying to achieve as a nation, we’re unlikely to grant each other credibility 
as speakers in the national conversation. Fear plays a significant part in democratic 
polarisation and disengagement. In this thesis, highlighting the epistemic harms perpetuated 
by political fear has been a significant part of  my contribution to the turn to ethics. 
Without a stable background of  originary exclusions — among them a strong commitment to 
Australia’s political, rather than ethnic culture — and under the epistemically paralysing and 
polarising effects of  fear, citizens cannot agree on the purpose of  political conversation, let 
alone engage in it. Fear-mongering speech is ultimately objectionable because the spread of  
fear through a polity precludes collaborative care for the nation and its wellbeing. So let me 
be clear: when discriminatory, fear-mongering speech is not rejected, a style of  political 
rhetoric is prioritised over the overall potential for citizens’ freedom of  speech. Some speech is 
 Fish, ‘There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech’, p. 104. 149
!  52
always going to be ‘chilled’. ‘The only question is the political one of  which speech is going to 
be chilled.’  It seems preferable to chill a politicians’ damaging, opportunistic style of  150
rhetoric than to chill the speech of  citizens.  
Resolving this issue is not a matter of  everyone needing to speak the same way, or to say the 
same things. But in a democracy, everyone does need to be respected as an equal speaker, and 
certain purposes of  speech need to be prioritised and mutually accepted; first and foremost, 
citizens’ expression must be protected, not politicians’. Political fear, I have shown, is 
antithetical to this purpose. Perhaps, as Fish concludes, this is simply a matter of  politics; 
having the nous to pick up the lines within which ‘free speech’ is bound and convince others 
they should be shaped around our own ideals.  In the debate over Senator Hanson and 151
others’ fear-mongering rhetoric, we do seem to be disagreeing over whose conception of  ‘free 
speech’ truly defends our virtues and values. But when we’ve considered the effects of  fear on 
a pluralist liberal democracy, objecting to fear-mongering political rhetoric no longer looks 
like a matter of  partisan politics. The fragmentation of  our discursive community along these 
lines goes to the core of  our commitments as a liberal democratic society. Once we consider 
what politicians’ discriminatory, fear-mongering speech actually does — silencing citizens, 
perpetrating epistemic harms and injustices against all citizens, polarising our discourse 
beyond citizens’ meaningful communication — it becomes clear that this is not speech that 
protects freedom of  citizens’ speech and democratic participation. In fact, it achieves the 
opposite.  
 Ibid, p.111.150
 Ibid, p.110. 151
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The problem with getting this argument across is that politicians’ freedom to engage in a 
rhetorical style is a relatively digestible concept of  freedom coming into conflict with the more 
nuanced and invisible freedom of  speech violated by fear’s epistemic injustices. This is an 
even greater challenge given the paralytic and divisive effects of  fear on citizens who are 
already feeling marginalised and ignored by those they perceive to be political and cultural 
elites. But at least without the high octane nature of  discriminatory fear being circulated by 
those in power, citizens might have a better chance of  understanding each other, and thereby 
having these difficult but democratic conversations that need to be had. 
CONCLUSION  
In this thesis, I have re-centred fear as an emotion that deserves political philosophy’s 
concerted attention by focusing on the issue of  fear-mongering political rhetoric. I have 
argued against the idea that such speech should be protected. I clarified what is at stake in this 
debate by considering the effects of  fear on citizens and democratic discourse. Fear is a 
morally and epistemically narrowing emotion, and when it takes root, the foundations 
required for a functioning democracy are destabilised. Citizens’ speech is suppressed and 
silenced, we sacrifice the norms that give our political discourse meaning, and our discursive 
communities are pulled further and further apart. Under such conditions, care for the nation, 
its welfare and basic principles is critically compromised. We care about freedom of  speech 
for the sake of  citizens’ sovereignty and freedom. We should therefore be sceptical when 
politicians’ speech quells our own. 
Fear is the culprit here. It perpetuates its own cycle of  polarisation and harm to minorities, to 
our discourse, and to our democratic politics. I think the damages I’ve canvassed here can be 
identified more broadly when we reflect on the fact that increasingly polarised discourse 
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makes us all fearful — “How could they think that?” “What’s happening to our country?” 
“What are we to do?” It seems that when discourse becomes polarised, we are all thinking 
these things, but are unable to get past the paralysis and hostility of  fear. I’ve argued here that 
the problem with fear-mongering speech can be explained by looking at the harms of  the 
emotion of  fear itself, and what it does to our ability to communicate with each other. 
Perhaps, then, the answer is to do what we are told to do for any fear: face it. Rather than run 
away, we might try bravely and calmly bringing our fear into our life until it is old news. 
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